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Abstract: A few recent papers have derived estimates of the repre-
sentative agent’s risk aversion by comparing the statistical density
of asset returns and the state-price density. The implied risk aver-
sion estimates obtained in these studies are puzzling, exhibiting (i)
pronounced U-shaped patterns (a ￿smile￿) and (ii) negative values.
This paper analyzes three potential explanations for these phenom-
ena: (i) heterogeneity in investor preferences, (ii) di￿culties in esti-
mating agents’ beliefs and (iii) heterogeneous beliefs among agents.
Our results show that preferences alone cannot explain the patterns
reported in the literature. Misestimation of investors’ beliefs caused
by nonstationarity of the return process cannot explain the smile
either. The patterns of beliefs misestimation required to generate
the empirical implied risk aversion estimates found in the literature
suggest that heterogeneous beliefs are the most likely cause of the
smile.
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Equilibrium asset prices re￿ect investors’ preferences and beliefs. Historically, ￿nancial theory
has made assumptions about investor preferences and beliefs in order to make predictions about
asset prices. Recently, recognizing that preferences are not well-understood and hard to estimate
compared to beliefs and asset prices, a new strand of research has emerged that estimates
investors’ risk aversion by comparing their beliefs with asset prices. Estimates obtained in this
fashion, which relate investors’ risk aversion to the level of aggregate wealth in the economy,
are called implied risk aversion functions.
Implied risk aversion estimates exhibit two puzzling features: they are strongly U-shaped
around the futures price (￿smile￿) and exhibit negative values. This paper analyzes three poten-
tial explanations for these patterns: (i) heterogeneity in investor preferences, (ii) misestimation
of investors’ beliefs, and (iii) heterogeneous beliefs among investors.
The ￿rst possibility explored is whether heterogeneous preferences among investors aggregate
in such a way as to lead to an oddly-behaved economy-wide risk aversion function. It turns out
that preferences aggregate quite well. The economy-wide risk aversion function inherits some
of the properties of individual agents’ risk aversion. Furthermore, risk-sharing among agents
in the economy tends to even-out any oddly-behaved individual preferences, suggesting that
heterogeneous preferences among investors cannot explain the implied risk aversion smile.
Implied risk aversion functions are very sensitive to misestimation of investors’ beliefs. Since
beliefs are typically estimated using historical return distributions, a major potential source
of misestimation is the nonstationarity of asset returns, which has been documented recently.
However, it turns out that return nonstationarity is unable to explain the implied risk aversion
smile. Using the relationship between implied risk aversion misestimation and beliefs mises-
timation, it is demonstrated that the patterns of beliefs misestimation that can be inferred
from the implied risk aversion estimates are very peculiar and hard to reproduce in simple
homogeneous beliefs situations.
Turning to heterogeneous beliefs as a potential explanation, it is shown that complex belief mis-
estimation patterns and corresponding ￿smile e￿ects￿ in implied risk aversion can be obtained
easily when the assumption of homogeneous beliefs is relaxed. Fitting a simple model with two
classes of investors with heterogeneous beliefs closely reproduces the empirical misestimation
patterns, suggesting that heterogeneous beliefs are the most likely cause of the smile.Why does Implied Risk Aversion smile?
1 Introduction
In a representative agent economy, equilibrium asset prices re￿ect the agent’s preferences and
beliefs. As was shown by Rubinstein (1994), any two of the following imply the third: (i)
the representative agent’s preferences, (ii) his subjective probability assessments, and (iii) the
state-price density. Therefore, essentially any state-price density can be reconciled with the
distribution of asset prices by using an appropriate set of preferences for the representative
agent. Building on this insight, a few recent papers in the literature have derived estimates
of the representative agent’s degree of risk aversion from the state-price density Q and the
subjective probability distributionP. In e￿ect, the estimation of implied risk aversion functions
reverses the classical direction of research, which was to move from assumptions on subjective
probabilities and risk aversion to conclusions about the state-price density (Jackwerth and
Rubinstein (2001)). The motivation for this new strand of research is that utility functions are
not well-understood and hard to estimate compared to state-price densities and beliefs.
Letting S denote the aggregate endowment in the economy, A￿t-Sahalia and Lo (2000) derive
a local estimator of the investor’s degree of relative risk aversion as½(S) = S(P 0(S)=P(S) ¡
Q0(S)=Q(S)), where P denotes the statistical density of future asset prices and Q the state-
price density. In a related paper, Jackwerth (2000) shows that the representative agent’s implied
absolute risk aversion is given by ®(S) = P 0(S)=P(S)¡Q0(S)=Q(S). As a practical matter, P
is estimated from historical return realizations andQ from traded option prices.
The empirical risk aversion estimates obtained by these authors are puzzling. Using S&P
500 index option prices and the historical density of index returns, A￿t-Sahalia and Lo (2000)
￿nd that implied relative risk aversion is not constant across S&P 500 index values. Rather,
it exhibits considerable variation, with values ranging from about 2 to 60, and is U-shaped
around the futures price. Using minute-by-minute S&P 500 index option, index futures and
index level quotes, Jackwerth (2000) ￿nds that implied absolute risk aversion is U-shaped
around the current forward price. He even ￿nds that implied absolute risk aversion can become
1signi￿cantly negative, with values as low as ¡15.1
This paper aims at explaining this ￿smile e￿ect￿ in implied risk aversion. Although the smile
e￿ect in option implied volatility has received considerable attention, very few papers have
sought to investigate the reasons for the implied risk aversion smile. Brown and Jackwerth
(2001) is a notable exception. In a recent paper, these authors look for ways to reconcile
Jackwerth’s (2000) empirical estimates of the pricing kernel and economic theory. The focus
of their work lies in explaining why the pricing kernel is increasing in wealth (i.e. implied risk
aversion is negative) for a range of index values centered on the current index level. Among
the explanations they propose are crash-o-phobia ￿ investors irrationally overestimating the
likelihood of a market crash ￿ and state-dependent utility.
Although the volatility smile and the implied risk aversion smile are closely related (Jackwerth
(2000)), looking at implied risk aversion rather than the volatility smile can help us understand
what is actually going on on ￿nancial markets. The reason is the link between the representative
agent’s risk aversion, his subjective probability assessments and the state-price density alluded
to above. An analysis of the causes of the implied risk aversion smile must therefore resort to
one of these factors:
² The ￿rst possibility is that the representative agent may be a poor assumption. Het-
erogeneous preferences among investors may aggregate in such a way as to lead to an
oddly-behaved aggregate risk aversion function for the representative agent.
² Second, agents’ subjective probability assessments may be misestimated, leading to a
distortion in implied risk aversion estimates. Since agents’ beliefs are unobservable, a
long tradition has emerged in ￿nancial economics that uses historical return realizations
to estimate investors’ beliefs. As was noted by Brown and Jackwerth (2001), however, the
problem with this approach is that the estimates thus obtained arebackward-looking, while
investor beliefs are by de￿nition forward-looking. To the extent that the return process is
nonstationary, belief estimates obtained from historical return frequency distributions will
not match agents’ actual probability assessments. Another issue with estimates based on
historical data is that they ignore the possibility of agents’ having heterogeneous beliefs.
1Empirical estimates of risk aversion have also been obtained by Rosenberg and Engle (1999). Using the
power function to approximate the empirical pricing kernel over the period 1991-1995, they show that risk
aversion exhibits considerable variation through time, with values ranging from 1.21 to 57.99.
2To the extent that such heterogeneity in beliefs exists, it will lead to further distortions
in implied risk aversion estimates.
² The third possibility is that the state-price density may be misestimated and distort
implied risk aversion estimates. Note, however, that the estimation of state-price densities
does not su￿er of the same pitfalls as the statistical density:
1. State-price densities are forward-looking estimates obtained directly fromobserved
forward-looking variables, namely traded asset prices.
2. They are unique market prices, irrespective of whether investors have homogeneous
or heterogeneous beliefs or preferences.
The analysis in this paper therefore focuses on investor preferences and beliefs as potential
explanations for the ￿smile e￿ect￿ in implied risk aversion. More speci￿cally, the properties
of implied risk aversion estimates are considered in three nested settings: (i) heterogeneous
preferences among agents, (ii) misestimation of agents’ subjective beliefs by the researcher, and
(iii) heterogeneous beliefs among agents. The question we seek to answer is whether each of
these factors is su￿cient to generate implied risk aversion functions that are consistent with
the empirical smile patterns.
Our results show that a number of properties of individual agents’ risk aversion functions
carry over to the representative agent’s risk aversion function, implying that heterogeneous
preferences alone cannot explain the puzzling implied risk aversion patterns documented by
A￿t-Sahalia and Lo (2000) and Jackwerth (2000). Turning to the misestimation of agents’
beliefs as a potential explanation, we demonstrate that implied risk aversion estimates are very
sensitive to errors in estimating the statistical density. In order to determine whether the
nonstationarity of the return process can account for the smile e￿ect, a simulation of Pan’s
(2002) stochastic volatility and jumps model is performed. The implied risk aversion estimates
obtained from this simulation still exhibit a smile, implying that return nonstationarity cannot
explain the smile. We then derive the formal link between beliefs misestimation and implied
risk aversion estimation errors and obtain the patterns of beliefs misestimation implied by the
risk aversion smile. These patterns suggest that empirical estimates of agents’ beliefs based on
historical data overestimate the probability of very high return realizations, and underestimate
the probability of very low return realizations. We then show that these complex misestimation
3patterns are hard to understand if agents have homogeneous beliefs. However, they can easily
arise in a heterogeneous-beliefs economy, suggesting that heterogeneous beliefs are the most
likely cause of the implied risk aversion smile.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the
properties of implied risk aversion functions and examines the role of preferences and beliefs in
explaining the smile patterns obtained in the literature. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
In order to study the properties of implied risk aversion estimates in a setting with heterogeneous
beliefs and preferences, consider a continuous-time economy with a large number of risk-averse
agents, none of which have in￿uence on equilibrium prices. Each agenti = 1:::I lives for T



































where Pi denotes agent i’s beliefs, Q the risk-neutral probability measure,c consumption, r the
riskless interest rate and W wealth. Note that this formulation allows agents to di￿er both in
their preferences and beliefs.
Using the Radon-Nikodym derivative »i = Pi(S)=Q(S) and the Lagrange multiplier ¸i, this











































4Therefore, for each agent in the economy, the following relationship between his beliefsPi(S)




























































s;s) and market prices (the state-price density Q). For the reasons
discussed in the introduction, assume that although market prices are observable andQ can
therefore be estimated accurately, the researcher does not observe each individual agent’s beliefs
Pi. Rather, he only has a single estimate of the statistical density of asset prices. Letting ˆ P





























Thus, the researcher’s implied risk aversion estimate is equal to the agent’s actual risk aversion,
scaled by the sensitivity of the agent’s consumption to shifts in aggregate consumption@ci
s=@S,
plus an estimation error arising from the fact that the researcher does not observe the agent’s
beliefs perfectly.
The problem at this point is that the sensitivity of the agent’s consumption to shifts in aggregate
consumption @ci
s=@S is unobservable. In order to derive the implied risk aversion in terms of








































































































s;s) denotes investor i’s degree of absolute risk aversion on his
optimal consumption path. Implied aggregate absolute risk aversion®(S) is thus the harmonic
sum of individual investors’ degree of absolute risk aversion, plus an adjustment term that
depends both on investors’ degree of risk aversion and on the divergence between individual
agents’ actual beliefs and the researcher’s estimates. At this level of generality, almost any
pattern of implied risk aversion is possible. The analysis below considers which patterns of
implied risk aversion can emerge depending on (i) the degree of heterogeneity in individual
agents’ preferences, (ii) the nature of the divergence between agents’ beliefs and the researcher’s
estimates, and (iii) the degree of heterogeneity in beliefs among agents.
3 Properties of Implied Risk Aversion Functions
This section analyzes the equilibrium properties of implied risk aversion functions in three
nested settings in order to determine what it takes in order to explain the risk aversion smile
documented in the literature. Section 3.1 considers the special case in which only preferences
di￿er among agents, i.e. where agents have homogeneous beliefs and these can be estimated
accurately. The analysis demonstrates that in such a situation, individual agents’ preferences
must have very peculiar properties in order to generate the implied risk aversion smile. Hetero-
geneous preferences among agents alone therefore seem insu￿cient to explain the smile. Section
3.2 then considers a somewhat more general situation in which agents have homogeneous be-
liefs, but these cannot be estimated accurately. It is shown that even a minor misestimation of
agents’ beliefs has a signi￿cant impact on implied risk aversion functions. Nonstationarity of
the return process, however, is shown to be unable to explain the implied risk aversion smile.
The patterns of beliefs misestimation consistent with the implied risk aversion smile are then
6derived. The peculiar patterns that arise from this analysis suggest that heterogeneous beliefs
are the most likely cause of the smile, an issue addressed in section 3.3.
3.1 Homogeneous Beliefs and Perfect Estimation
This section considers the case in which all agents in the economy have homogeneous beliefs
and these can be estimated accurately by the researcher. Under these circumstances, one can
establish the following result:
Proposition 1: Suppose that beliefs are homogeneous and can be estimated accurately. Then,
the implied absolute risk aversion function ®(S) is the harmonic sum of individual agents’
absolute risk aversion on the optimal consumption path,®i(ci
s).
Proof: Under the assumption of homogeneous beliefs and accurate estimation, ˆ P 0(S)= ˆ P(S) =
P 0



















Equation (12) is the well-known result that risk tolerance is additive across agents, implying
that the economy-wide risk tolerance equals the sum of individual agents’ risk tolerance (Wilson
(1968)). This result has an important implication for empirical implied risk aversion estimates,
which is stated as
Corollary 1: If all agents are risk-averse, have homogeneous beliefs and these beliefs are
accurately estimated, then estimated implied risk aversion is strictly positive.
Furthermore, under homogeneous beliefs and accurate estimation, some additional properties of
individual agents’ risk aversion carry over to implied risk aversion. The ￿rst follows immediately
from Proposition 1, and is stated as
Corollary 2: If all agents have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility, have homoge-
neous beliefs and these beliefs are accurately estimated, then estimated implied risk aversion
also displays constant absolute risk aversion.
The other results are somewhat less immediate and are therefore stated as a separate proposi-
tion:
7Proposition 2: Suppose all agents have increasing (decreasing) absolute risk aversion, have
homogeneous beliefs and these beliefs are accurately estimated. Then, estimated implied risk
aversion also displays increasing (decreasing) absolute risk aversion.


















































Since all agents are risk-averse and have homogeneous beliefs, risk-sharing among them implies
that @ci
s=@S > 0 for all i. Therefore, (13) will be positive whenever ®0
i(ci
s) > 0 for all i and
negative whenever ®0
i(ci
s) < 0 for all i, establishing the result.
Proposition 2 implies that if all agents have CRRA utility, which exhibits decreasing absolute
risk aversion, then the market-wide risk aversion function will exhibit decreasing absolute risk
aversion as well. For the special case of CRRA utility, however, even stronger results can be
established. As a ￿rst step, let us consider the properties of the impliedrelative risk aversion
function, ½(S) = S®(S).
Proposition 3: Suppose that beliefs are homogeneous and are estimated accurately. Then,
implied relative risk aversion ½(S) is a harmonic weighted average of individual agents’ rela-
tive risk aversion, with the weights in this average given by each agent’s share of aggregate
consumption at a given level of the aggregate endowment.










































s;s) denotes agent i’s relative risk aversion on the optimal
consumption path.
This result, which was ￿rst derived by Benninga and Mayshar (2000) in a somewhat di￿erent
setting, suggests that relative risk aversion will typically depend on the aggregate endowment,
even if all agents have constant relative risk aversion. Benninga and Mayshar (2000) show that
if agents have heterogeneous, CRRA preferences, then the economy-wide relative risk aversion
will be decreasing in the aggregate endowment. This is so because as the aggregate endowment
increases, relatively less risk averse agents’ share of aggregate consumption increases, driving
8down the average in (14). Although we refer the reader to their paper for a formal proof, note




























































































which will indeed be negative when @ci
s=@S > ci
s=S for low risk aversion agents and @ci
s=@S <
ci
s=S for high risk aversion agents. An alternate way to understand this result is to note that
(15) can be rewritten as
½
0(S) = ®(S)(1 ¡ ´) (16)
where ´ denotes the average elasticity of agents’ consumption with respect to the aggregate
endowment, with the weights in this average given by the inverse of agents’ relative risk aversion
coe￿cients ½i. ´ will exceed one because less risk averse agents’ share of aggregate consumption
is increasing in S, implying that market-wide relative risk aversion is decreasing inS.
The results in this section demonstrate that some of the properties of individual agents’ utility
functions carry over to the representative agent’s risk aversion. This has a number of important
implications for our assessment of empirical estimates of implied risk aversion functions:
1. If we are willing to assume that all agents in the economy are risk averse, then the negative
estimates obtained in some recent research (such as Jackwerth (2000)) cannot be caused by
heterogeneity in investor preferences. Rather, they must result from divergences between
estimates of the statistical density and agents’ actual beliefs or from heterogeneous beliefs
among agents.
2. If we are also willing to accept that agents have nonincreasing absolute risk aversion (as
postulated by Arrow (1970) and supported by everyday oservation) or constant relative
risk aversion, then the U-shaped estimates obtained by Jackwerth (2000) and A￿t-Sahalia
and Lo (2000) have a similar explanation.2
2Although A￿t-Sahalia and Lo (2000) estimate arelative risk aversion function, it is easy to check from their
Figure 4 that their representative agent also exhibits increasing absolute risk aversion by noting that the slope
93. If we are willing to accept that agents are risk-averse butnot that they have nonincreasing
absolute risk aversion, then U-shaped patterns as documented by A￿t-Sahalia and Lo
(2000) are theoretically possible. However, one would still need to explain why relative
risk aversion reaches levels as high as 60 for index values about 15% below the current
futures price and as high as 30 for index values 15% above. Clearly, factors such as habit
persistence can be invoked to explain high risk aversion at low index levels. However, they
cannot account for the increase in risk aversion at high index levels. A similar conclusion
holds for state-dependent utility (as noted by Brown and Jackwerth (2001), in order to
generate a U-shaped risk aversion with respect to the index, the relationship between the
state variable and aggregate wealth must be non-monotonic).
Could heterogeneous preferences among agents help in this respect? Note that even
if one did not assume nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, equation (14) would hold,
and relative risk aversion would be a consumption-weighted average of individual agents’
relative risk aversion. Furthermore, in each state of nature, those agents with relatively
low risk aversion would have a share of aggregate consumption exceeding their relative
wealth and drive down the representative agent’s risk aversion. Therefore, the smile
pattern in A￿t-Sahalia and Lo (2000) could only arise if a very signi￿cant proportion of
agents had extremely high risk aversion at high and low index values (and very few agents
had low risk-aversion at those same index values). Although this is not inconceivable, it
seems very unlikely.
The analysis in this section therefore suggests that heterogeneous preferences alone cannot
account for the implied risk aversion smile ￿ if anything, the e￿ect of risk-sharing among agents
with heterogeneous preferences on the properties of the economy-wide risk aversion function
makes the smile even more puzzling.
3.2 Homogeneous Beliefs and Imperfect Estimation
This section considers the properties of implied risk aversion functions in an economy in which
agents have homogeneous beliefs, but these beliefs cannot be estimated perfectly. In this setting,
one has
of rays drawn through the origin of their diagram and the points on their implied risk aversion function is
increasing for index values between 415 and 440, between 465 and 475 and above 500.
10Proposition 4: Suppose that agents’ beliefs are homogeneous but imperfectly estimated.
























where ²(S) denotes an implied risk aversion estimation error andP(S) agents’ common beliefs.
Proof: Under the assumption of homogeneity in beliefs, one has P 0
i(S)=Pi(S) = P 0(S)=P(S)
for all i, so the term ( ˆ P 0(S)= ˆ P(S)¡P 0
i(S)=Pi(S)) is common across agents and the implied risk



















Simplifying then gives (17).
Equation (17) demonstrates that at any aggregate wealth level S, the divergence between
estimated implied risk aversion and the representative agent’s actual risk aversion will depend
on the divergence between agents’ actual and estimated beliefs. This immediately raises a
number of questions: How sensitive are implied risk aversion estimates to misestimation of the
statistical density? Can factors that lead to di￿culties in estimating the statistical density
￿ such as nonstationarity of the return process ￿ account for the implied risk aversion smile?
And if not, what kind of beliefs misestimation do the empirical implied risk aversion estimates
suggest and how can it be explained?
3.2.1 The Sensitivity of Implied Risk Aversion to Beliefs Misestimation
Consider ￿rst the issue of the sensitivity of implied risk aversion estimates to misestimation of
the statistical density. Do small beliefs misestimations only lead to small distortions in implied
risk aversion estimates, or do they have a signi￿cant impact? The answer to this question is not
immediately obvious, because the estimation error²(S) = ˆ P 0(S)= ˆ P(S) ¡ P 0(S)=P(S) depends
not only on actual and estimated densitiesP(S) and ˆ P(S), but also on their derivatives. Thus,
large implied risk aversion estimation errors could arise even if ˆ P(S) ¡ P(S) is small.
To gain some insight into the magnitude of this e￿ect, consider a numerical example. Sup-
pose that agents’ beliefs are lognormal with E(ln(S)) = ¹ and Var(ln(S)) = ¾2 and that the



























































2 (ˆ ¹ ¡ ¹)
¢
Figure 1 depicts the actual and estimated statistical densities P(S) and ˆ P(S), as well as the
implied risk aversion estimation error ²(S) that arises if the researcher slightly underestimates
the variability of aggregate wealth (ˆ ¾ = 0:095 < ¾ = 0:1). The upper panel of Figure 1 shows
that the small parameter estimation error of 5% used in this example only leads to minor
di￿erences between the actual and the estimated density. However, as can be seen in the lower
panel, the magnitude of the implied risk aversion estimation error is sizable.
Of course, this argument goes the other way as well: statistical distributions inferred from the
state-price density and some set of (assumed) investor preferences are not too sensitive to the
particular speci￿cation of the market-wide risk-aversion function chosen. If we are willing to
make certain assumptions about economy-wide investor preferences, we can therefore estimate
the statistical density directly from the state-price density in order to determine what kind of
beliefs were underlying the state-price density at a given point in time. 3 Agents’ subjective
probability assessments can be estimated as follows: supposing that agents’ preferences are






















3Rubinstein (1994) shows how to perform this estimation in a discrete-state setting. His approach uses




















with ° ´ P(S)=Q(S) a constant that ensures thatP(S) integrates to 1. Thus, having knowledge
of the state-price density Q and assuming a particular functional form for the market-wide risk
aversion function ®(S), we can infer the statistical density P.
What kind of beliefs do the empirical state-price densities suggest? To answer this question,
the statistical density was computed from the S&P 500 empirical state-price density for three
types of market-wide utility functions:









A = °Q(S)exp(®(S ¡ S)) (25)
























It is a well-known fact that if agents’ beliefs are lognormal, then the Black-Scholes model
will obtain in this case.




























This latter setting aims at capturing the case of agents with heterogeneous CRRA pref-
erences described in section 3.1, which results in a decreasing market-wide relative risk
aversion.
The estimation is performed as follows. In a ￿rst step, the state-price density is estimated
using the semi-parametric approach and the data of A￿t-Sahalia and Lo (2000). The data,
13which is described in more detail in their paper, consists of 14431 S&P 500 index option prices
for the period January 4, 1993 to December 31, 1993. The semi-parametric approach involves
regressing option implied volatility nonparametrically on moneyness and time to expiration
and then estimating the state-price density as the second derivative of the Black-Scholes option
pricing formula with respect to the strike price, using the nonparametric volatility estimate as
an input. As recommended in their paper, the kernel functions and bandwidth values are chosen
so as to optimize the properties of the state-price density estimator (Gaussian kernel functions
and bandwidths of 0.040 and 20.52 for moneyness and time to expiration, respectively). In
a second step, the subjective probabilities are computed according to the above expressions,
assuming a relative risk aversion at the current futures price of 450 of 4 for all three cases
considered, implying ® = 4=450 for case 1, ½ = 4 for case 2 and ½ = 4 ¢ 450 for case 3.4
The estimation results for the state-price density and the subjective probabilities corresponding
to the above three cases are depicted in Figure 2 for time horizons of 1, 2, 4 and 6 months.
Note that although there is a signi￿cant di￿erence between the state-price density and the
statistical densities re￿ecting the e￿ect of risk aversion, the three statistical densities arealmost
indistinguishable for all time horizons considered. This con￿rms the results from Figure 1 and
suggests that di￿erences in the assumed investor preferences have very little impact on the
beliefs that can be inferred from the state-price density. 5 However, these beliefs do not tell us
what beliefs estimates based on historical returns are potentially missing, the issue we wish to
address now.
3.2.2 A Potential Explanation: Nonstationarity of the Return Process
The above results demonstrate that implied risk aversion estimates are very sensitive to the
underlying statistical density estimates and that minor density estimation errors can lead to
large perturbations in implied risk aversion. Beliefs, however, are intrinsically hard to estimate.
As mentioned in the introduction, a long tradition has developed in ￿nancial economics to
4The value of 4 is arbitrary but not out of line with existing empirical evidence. Based on an analysis of
the demand for risky assets, Friend and Blume (1975) ￿nd that the average coe￿cient of relative risk aversion
is probably well in excess of one and perhaps in excess of two. Using an analysis of deductibles in insurance
contracts, DrŁze (1981) ￿nds somewhat higher values. When ￿tting a CRRA model to their data, A￿t-Sahalia
and Lo (2000) ￿nd a value of 12.7.
5Rubinstein (1994) comes to the same conclusion.
14estimate (unobservable) beliefs based on (observed) historical returns. Using atime series of
past returns to estimate subjective probabilities at a given point in time can be problematic
because historical returns do not necessarily tell us much about agents’ current beliefs. 6 A
major potential source of beliefs misestimation is the nonstationarity of the return process,
which has recently been documented by Pan (2002).
In order to determine whether this nonstationarity is su￿cient to explain the implied risk
aversion smile, the following empirical analysis is performed: ￿rst, the state-price densityQ is
again estimated using the semi-parametric method and the data of A￿t-Sahalia and Lo (2000) for
time horizons of 1, 2, 4 and 6 months. In a second step, the statistical densityP is estimated by
simulating the stochastic volatility and jumps model of Pan (2002) for S&P 500 index returns,
and running a kernel density estimation on these return realizations. The starting values for
the simulation are chosen so as to be consistent with those used when generating the state-
price densities, i.e. a riskless interest rate of 3.10% and a dividend yield of 2.78% as reported
in Table 3 of A￿t-Sahalia and Lo (2000), an initial volatility equal to the implied volatility of
an at-the-money option with a maturity equal to the time horizon of the simulation, and the
initial cash price implied by the spot-futures parity for the reference futures price of 450 used in
the state-price density estimation. The kernel density estimation is based on a Gaussian kernel
and bandwidths selected using the Silverman’s rule, i.e. h = ¾S(4=3n)1=5, where n = 10000
denotes the number of simulation runs and ¾S the unconditional standard deviation of the
index value at the end of the simulation horizon. The bandwidths for time horizons of 1, 2, 4
and 6 months are 2.22, 3.09, 4.49 and 5.64, respectively, and the resulting densities depicted in
Figure 3. In a third step, the degree of relative risk aversion implied by these density estimates
is computed as ½(S) = S (P 0(S)=P(S) ¡ Q0(S)=Q(S)). As can be seen in Figure 4, even when
accounting for return nonstationarity, implied risk aversion exhibits considerable variation for
all four time horizons considered. Interestingly, the results in the fourth panel of Figure 4 are
very similar to Figure 4 of Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000) (who report results for the 6 months
horizon): implied risk aversion is moderate around the current futures price, but ￿smiles￿ to
reach values of almost 30 for index values about 15% above and below the futures price. This
suggests that the nonstationarity of index returns cannot explain the implied risk aversion smile
6Although Jackwerth (2000) tries to address this problem by varying the length of the historical sample he
uses from 2 to 10 years and shows that his results do not change signi￿cantly, the basic issue of using actual
return realizations to estimate agents’ beliefs remains.
15documented by these authors.
The results in Figure 4 have another important implication. Observe that the implied risk
aversion patterns are di￿erent depending on the time horizon considered. Although there is no
conclusive experimental evidence on the issue, it is not unreasonable to argue that preferences
should not depend strongly on the time horizon considered, especially for the short horizons
of 1 to 6 months considered here. Similarly, one would not expect investor preferences to
change abruptly through time, making the considerable time-variation in implied risk aversion
documented, for instance, by Rosenberg and Engle (1999) a puzzling phenomenon. On the
other hand, rational investors do update their beliefs frequently, and changes in investor beliefs
therefore appear to be a more natural cause of these shifts in implied risk aversion through
time than shifts in investor preferences.
3.2.3 What Patterns of Belief Misestimation does Implied Risk Aversion Suggest?
Since nonstationarity in asset returns is unable to explain the implied risk aversion smile, beliefs
estimates based on historical returns must be missing something else. Can we tell what? Do
the implied risk aversion estimates suggest any particular patterns of beliefs misestimation, and
if so, how can these patterns be explained?
To perform this analysis, let us reverse the perspective. Suppose we knew agent’s preferences.
Then, by analyzing the relationship between implied risk aversion estimation error and beliefs
estimation error, we would be able to determine what our beliefs estimates miss. The reason is
that with knowledge of agents’ actual risk aversion, ²(S) is known, and the beliefs estimation











































16with ° ´ ˆ P(S)=P(S) again a constant that ensures that P(S) integrates to 1. The density
misestimation factor given in equation (30) allows us to determine to what extent historical
returns under- or overestimate the probability of certain states of nature based on a comparison
of implied risk aversion estimates and an assessment of agents’ actual preferences. As a numer-
ical illustration, suppose that implied risk aversion is quadratic, reaches a minimum of¡15 at
a wealth level of 1 and a value of zero at wealth levels of 0:97 and 1:03, the basic picture that
emerges from Figure 3, Panel D of Jackwerth (2000), and assume that the true coe￿cient of
absolute risk aversion is 4.7 Together, these functions, which are depicted in the upper panel of
Figure 5, result in an implied risk aversion estimation error of²(S) = ¡19+(15=0:032)(S¡1)2.
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A plot of this function for ° = 1 is reported in the lower panel of Figure 5. The density
misestimation factor suggests that historical return data underestimates agents’ assessment
of the probability of very low aggregate wealth states (Brown and Jackwerth’s (2001) ￿crash-
o-phobia￿), slightly overestimates the probability of wealth states slightly below 1, slightly
underestimates the probability of wealth states slightly above 1 and signi￿cantly overestimates
the probability of very high wealth states. Note that the misestimation factor exhibits a very
pronounced pattern, and it is therefore unlikely that it is merely the consequence of random
factors in estimation, such as measurement error. Agents’ beliefs seem to di￿er in a systematic
fashion from the historical return distribution, suggesting that something peculiar must be
going on on the market.
What does it take to reproduce these patterns? To answer this question, let us consider a simple
setting in which both agents’ beliefs and historical returns are lognormal and analyze the beliefs
misestimation factor that arises when the mean and/or the variance di￿er. As illustrated
in Figure 6, misestimation of the mean leads to a monotonic misestimation factor. On the
other hand, misestimation of the variance leads to a bell- or U-shaped misestimation factor,
7Although it seems restrictive, this assumption is innocuous. Similar patterns would arise with any assumed
actual risk aversion function as long as it exhibits less curvature than the implied risk aversion function and
the functions cross twice. Given the high curvature of the implied risk aversion function reported by Jackwerth
(2000), this would be the case for a very wide set of investor preferences.
17as illustrated in Figure 7. Even if both mean and variance are allowed to di￿er, lognormal
densities are unable to reproduce the misestimation pattern documented in Figure 5. The
resulting misestimation factor will have either a single maximum or minimum (i.e. will be
either bell-shaped or U-shaped), but not both. This suggests that something more serious than
mere misestimation of expected returns or variance is happening.
3.3 Heterogeneous Beliefs
The analysis in the preceding section shows that historical return realizations are a poor pre-
dictor of agents’ beliefs, but that taking the nonstationarity of the return process into account
cannot explain the implied risk aversion smile. Moreover, simple homogeneous beliefs spec-
i￿cations are unable to account for the complex beliefs misestimation patterns implied by a
comparison of implied risk aversion and a wide range of reasonable investor preference assump-
tions. This section derives the properties of the beliefs misestimation factor under heterogeneous
beliefs and demonstrates that heterogeneous beliefs can easily give rise to complex misestima-
tion patterns such as those reported in Figure 5, making them the most likely cause of the
implied risk aversion smile.

































































denotes a local measure of the share of risk borne by
agent i in the economy and has the obvious property that
P
i Ái(S) = 1 for all S. For general
preferences, Ái will be a function of the aggregate endowmentS through the e￿ect of the latter
on agent i’s consumption ci









































with ° ´ ˆ P(S) again a constant ensuring that the Pi’s integrate to 1. Similarly, by comparing
(36) with (30) and (24), the corresponding expression linking the state-price density, preferences















with ° ´ Q(S) again a constant.












with ° ´ ˆ P(S)=
QI
i=1 Pi(S)Ái. Note that the ￿misestimation factor￿ ˆ P(S)=
QI
i=1 Pi(S)Ái is
the ratio of the estimated probability to the geometric weighted average of the individual
agents’ probability assessments, with the weights in this average given by the share of risk
Ái they bear in the economy. Therefore, an implied risk aversion smile could even arise in
a simple setting in which agents have CARA utility and heterogeneous beliefs, even if the
researcher’s probability assessment is equal to the arithmetic weighted average of individual
agents’ probability assessments.
Would heterogeneous beliefs of this form be su￿cient to explain the misestimation pattern
reported in Figure 5 without making extreme assumptions about the nature of beliefs and/or
their estimates? To answer this question, model (38) was ￿tted to the density misestimation
factor (31) for the following simple setting: There are two types of CARA agents indexed
by i 2 f1;2g, with respective weights Á and 1 ¡ Á in the economy. Both types view future
asset prices as lognormally distributed, but (potentially) di￿er in their estimate of mean¹i and
variance ¾2
i. The researcher’s beliefs estimate ˆ P is unbiased on average in the sense of being
equal to the weighted average of the two groups’ beliefs, ˆ P = ÁP1 + (1 ¡ Á)P2.
19Estimating this model using nonlinear least squares yields the parameter valuesÁ = 0:6042,
¹1 = 0:0806, ¹2 = ¡0:0007, ¾1 = 0:0393 and ¾2 = 0:0203. These results thus suggest that
beliefs are indeed heterogeneous. About 60% of agents are relatively optimistic and have an
estimate of expected returns of about 8%. The other group, representing roughly 40% of agents,
is relatively pessimistic and estimates expected returns to be about zero. Note that using the
expression Á = 1=(a1(1=a1 + 1=a2)) and the constraint that 1=(1=a1 + 1=a2) = 4 implied by
our initial assumptions about the representative agent’s preferences, one can recover the risk
aversion coe￿cients of both groups, a1 = 4=Á = 6:6203 and a2 = 4=(1 ¡ Á) = 10:1061. Thus,
in this particular example, those agents which are most pessimistic also turn out to be those
which have the highest degree of risk aversion.
Figure 8 depicts the actual and ￿tted misestimation factors. Note that in spite of the stringent
CARA preferences assumption it makes, the simple setting used here is able to reproduce the
density misestimation factor from Figure 5 quite closely. Even more importantly, no extreme or
unreasonable assumptions about the shape of individual investors’ beliefs need to be made in
order to obtain this result ￿ it su￿ces to allow individual investors to have parameter estimates
that di￿er somewhat and to assume that the researcher ignores beliefs heterogeneity in his
estimation, even though his beliefs estimate is the weighted average of the individual agents’
beliefs. Taken somewhat more broadly, this analysis has the important implication that under
heterogeneous beliefs, the density misestimation factor ￿ and therefore estimates of implied
risk aversion obtained under the implicit assumption of homogeneous beliefs ￿ can take almost
any shape. Heterogeneous beliefs ￿ in contrast to mere heterogeneity in preferences among
investors and ￿random￿ beliefs misestimation ￿ therefore appear as the most likely cause of the
smile e￿ect in implied risk aversion.
4 Conclusion
This paper considers the properties of implied risk aversion estimators in three nested settings
in order to explain the ￿smile e￿ect￿ in implied risk aversion. The analysis demonstrates that
if agents’ beliefs are homogeneous and can be estimated accurately, the implied risk aversion
function will inherit some of the properties of agents’ utility functions. More speci￿cally, if
all agents are risk averse, then implied risk aversion will be strictly positive. Moreover, if all
20agents display constant (decreasing, increasing) absolute risk aversion, so will the implied risk
aversion function. Finally, if all agents display constant relative risk aversion, implied relative
risk aversion will be decreasing.
In light of these aggregation results, heterogeneity in investor preferences is not su￿cient to
explain the implied risk aversion smile documented in the literature. Some misestimation of
investors’ beliefs is therefore likely to be responsible for the smile. It is shown that even
a minor misestimation of investors’ beliefs will lead to sizable perturbations of implied risk
aversion estimates. Conversely, moderate di￿erences in the market-wide risk aversion have no
signi￿cant impact on the beliefs that can be inferred from the state-price density.
An empirical analysis demonstrates that beliefs misestimation resulting from the nonstation-
arity of the return process cannot account for the smile. Furthermore, the patterns of beliefs
misestimation that can be inferred from the implied risk aversion estimates reported in the
literature are very peculiar and hard to reproduce in simple homogeneous beliefs situations. If
the assumption of homogeneity in investors’ beliefs is relaxed, however, complex belief mises-
timation patterns and corresponding ￿smile e￿ects￿ in implied risk aversion can be obtained
easily. Fitting a simple model with two classes of investors with heterogeneous, lognormal beliefs
closely reproduces the empirical beliefs misestimation patterns, suggesting that heterogeneity
in investor beliefs is the most likely cause of the implied risk aversion smile.
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Figure 1: E￿ect of Beliefs Misestimation on Implied Risk
Aversion. Implied absolute risk aversion estimation error ²(S) =
ˆ P0(S)= ˆ P(S)¡P0(S)=P(S), where P denotes investors’ actual beliefs and
ˆ P estimated beliefs in the case of lognormally distributed asset prices.
A slight underestimation of the standard deviation of asset prices by the
researcher leads to a sizable implied risk aversion estimation error (value
of the parameters: ¹ = ˆ ¹ = 0, ¾ = 0:1, ˆ ¾ = 0:095).



























































































































Figure 2: Inferring Beliefs from State Prices and Risk Aversion .
Semi-parametric estimation of the state-price density (SPD) and the cor-
responding statistical densities for three di￿erent risk aversion settings:
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) and decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA). Each case as-
sumes a coe￿cient of relative risk aversion of 4 at the current futures
price of 450. The three statistical densities obtained in this fashion are
almost indistinguishable.
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Figure 3: State-Price Density and Statistical Density with non-
stationary Returns. Semi-parametric estimation of the state-price
density and nonparametric estimation of the statistical density based on
a simulation of the stochastic volatility and jumps model of Pan (2002).
Results are reported for time horizons of 1, 2, 4 and 6 months (top left
to bottom right).





























































































































Figure 4: Implied Risk Aversion with nonstationary Returns .
Implied risk aversion patterns obtained from the semi-parametric esti-
mate of the state-price density and the nonparametric estimate of the
statistical density based on a simulation of the stochastic volatility and
jumps model of Pan (2002) and depicted in Figure 3. Results are re-
ported for time horizons of 1, 2, 4 and 6 months (top left to bottom
right). The risk aversion estimates exhibit a smile pattern comparable
to that documented by A￿t-Sahalia and Lo (2000), suggesting that re-
turn nonstationarity cannot account for the smile e￿ect reported by these
authors.

























































Figure 5: Link between Beliefs Misestimation and Risk Aver-
sion Misestimation. Errors in estimating investors’ beliefs can be
derived from implied risk aversion and assumptions about actual risk
aversion. The U-shaped risk implied risk aversion patterns reported in
the literature suggest that historical return data underestimates agents’
assessment of very low aggregate wealth states and overestimate the
probability of very high wealth states.
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Figure6: Expected Return Estimates and Beliefs Misestimation
Factor. Beliefs misestimation factor when the researcher’s estimate of
expected returns exceeds that of investors and asset prices are lognor-
mally distributed. The misestimation factor is strictly increasing (value
of the parameters: ¹ = 0, ˆ ¹ = 0:1, ¾ = ˆ ¾ = 0:2).
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Figure 7: Variance Estimates and Beliefs Misestimation Fac-
tor. Beliefs misestimation factor when the researcher’s estimate of the
variance in asset returns is lower than that of investors and asset prices
are lognormally distributed. The misestimation factor is single-peaked
(value of the parameters: ¹ = ˆ ¹ = 0, ¾ = 0:2, ˆ ¾ = 0:18).











































Figure 8: Heterogeneous Beliefs and Beliefs Misestimation Fac-
tor. Fitting a simple model with two classes of CARA investors with
heterogeneous, lognormal beliefs reproduces the beliefs misestimation
factor reported in Figure 5 quite closely. This occurs even though the
researcher’s probability assessments are constrained to equal the average
beliefs of the two groups of investors. Heterogeneous beliefs therefore
appear to be the most likely cause of the implied risk aversion smile.
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The Institute attempts to be both international and pluridisciplinary. The subjects in its curriculum, the 
composition of its teaching staff and the diversity of origin of its student body, confer upon it its international 
character.  Professors teaching at the Institute come from all regions of the world, and the approximately 650 
students arrive from some 60 different countries. Its international character is further emphasized by the use 
of both English and French as working languages. Its pluralistic approach - which draws upon the methods of  
economics, history, law, and political science  -reflects its aim to provide a broad approach and in-depth 
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